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right to a jury trial,"' CPLR 4544 places guidelines on how this may
be done." 5 In light of the considerable bargaining advantage enjoyed
by landlords in obtaining lease terms favorable to them, it seems
particularly appropriate to require, that the print in leases be both
legible and of sufficient size.' 8 In the future, it is hoped that the
courts will follow the lead of Koslowski and interpret CPLR 4544 in
a manner that will serve its intended purpose.
Ernest R. Stolzer
ARTICLE 75-ARBrrRATON
CPLR 7503(b): Clearly implied condition precedent to arbitration
insufficient to invoke threshold judicial resolution
Upon an application to stay arbitration under CPLR 7503(b)," 7
courts are empowered to determine whether the parties have com-
I See note 102 supra.
I' In other contexts, jury trial waiver clauses are proscribed by statute. For example,
waiver clauses in leases are void in actions for personal injury or property damage. N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 259-c (McKinney 1968); see Fay's Drug'Co. v. P & C Property Coop., Inc., 51
App. Div. 2d 887, 380 N.Y.S.2d 398 (4th Dep't 1976); Avenue Asocs. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc.
2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1975) (per curiam). Jury trial waivers
are also prohibited in retail instalment contracts and credit agreements. N.Y. PEs. PROP.
LAW §§ 403 (2)(h), 413 (10)(f) (McKinney 1976). The Koslowski court's reading of CPLR 4544
to give effect to the legislative intent finds support in the recent interpretation of a similar
provision in the Vehicle and Traffic Code which requires that notices of cancellation of
automobile insurance be printed in 12-point type. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 313(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). In Nassau Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 65 App. Div.2d 551, 408
N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1978), since the notice failed to meet the type-size requirements of
the statute, the insured was not deemed to have actual knowledge of its contents, despite the
insured having "read, and understood the notice." Id. at 553, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 957; see
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Rabinowitz, 65 App. Div. 2d 619, 409 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2d Dep't 1978); Lion
Ins. Co. v. Reilly, 61 App. Div. 2d 1047, 403 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1978).
"I In Sorbonne Apartments Co. v. Kranz, 96 Misc. 2d 396, 409 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. Kings County 1978), the court observed that the lease in question was a form prepared
by the Real Estate Board which was widely used in New York City. Id. at 397, 409 N.Y.S.2d
at 84. The court stated that "such leases heavily favor landlords and are onerous . . . to
tenants who are . . . in a virtually impossible bargaining position." Id. In fact, the Sorbonne
Apartments court contemplated declaring such leases void as against public policy. Id; see
1625 Emmons Ave. Owners, Inc. v. Abbamonte. N.Y.L.J., March 20, 1978, at 14, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County).
"I CPLR 7503(b) provides in part:
[A] party who has not participated in the arbitration and who has not made or
been served with an application to compel arbitration, may apply to stay arbitra-
tion on the ground that a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied
with or that the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by limitation under subdivi-
sion (b) of section 7502.
CPLR 7503(b) (Supp. Pam. 1964-1978).
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plied with the agreement to arbitrate. 18 This provision has generally
been interpreted to apply only in instances where it is clear that a
" Id. An arbitration agreement customarily requires that an aggrieved party initially
serve a notice of intention to arbitrate on the opposing party. Usually, this notice is also filed
with a designated arbitrator or an arbitration association for a determination of the parties'
rights and liabilities. See generally F. ELKouiu & E. ELKouiu, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 165
(3d ed. 1976); G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO CoMMERciAL ARBITRATION §§ 2.01 - .02
(1977). Since arbitration is a "creature of contract," Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins.
Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132-33, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-04 (1962); see County
of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 42 N.Y. 2d 123, 128, 366 N.E.2d 72, 75, 397 N.Y.S.2d
371, 374 (1977), it is subject to the fundamental rules of contract law. Zimmerman v. Cohen,
236 N.Y. 15, 19, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923). CPLR 7501 allows the court to enforce a written
agreement to arbitrate as it would any other enforceable agreement. Advisory Committee
Notes, 14 N.Y. STANDARD CIVIL PRACICE SERvIcEs 432 (1964).
Where the parties to a contract promise to submit any future dispute arising out of or
relating to their agreement to arbitration, courts generally require the arbitrator to resolve
any controversy. Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 384-85, 207 N.E.2d 190,
192-93, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146 (1965); see Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174
N.E.2d 463, 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252
N.Y. 284, 298, 169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.). In Exercycle, the Court of Appeals
noted that several exceptions exist to the policy of directing arbitration where there is a broad
arbitration clause. Such exceptions exist
(1) where fraud or duress. . . renders the agreement voidable. . . ; (2). . .where
the asserted claim is frivolous. . . ; (3) where the performance which is the subject
of the demand for arbitration is prohibited by statute. . . ; or (4) where a condi-
tion precedent to arbitration under the contract or an applicable statute has not
been fulfilled ....
Id. at 334-35, 174 N.E.2d at 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (citations omitted); see Susquehanna
Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 46 App. Div. 2d 104, 107,
361 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (3d Dep't 1974). Today, however, two of these exceptions are no longer
viable. In Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190,298 N.E.2d 42,344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973), discussed
in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 611, 639 (1974), the Court held that an arbitration clause
is separable from the remainder of the contract, so that "the agreement to arbitrate would
be 'valid' even if the substantive portions of the contract were induced by fraud." 32 N.Y.2d
at 198, 298 N.E.2d at 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see Information Sciences, Inc. v. Mohawk Data
Science Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 918, 374 N.E.2d 624, 403 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1978). Whether or not a
dispute is frivolous is also no longer a matter for the court to determine. This rule, known as
the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,
271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 519, 74
N.E.2d 464 (1947), has been discarded under CPLR 7501, which prohibits the court from
considering the merits of any controversy. Jeffrey Howard & Assocs. v. Shelter Programs,
Inc., 57 App. Div. 2d 886, 394 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1977); Jade Press, Inc. v. Packard, 91
Misc. 2d 820, 398 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1977). See generally D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE § 589 (1978).
CPLR 7502(b) provides that "[i]f at the time that a demand for arbitration was made
or a notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have
been barred" by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim, "a party may
assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration." CPLR 7502(b) (1963); see Memorandum of
Senator Joseph F. Periconi, reprinted in [1959] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 12, 27; see, e.g., Steiner v.
Wenning, 53 App. Div. 2d 437,442, 386 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (2d Dep't 1976); Schlaifer v. Kaiser,
84 Misc. 2d 817, 822, 377 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); Plastic Molded
Arts Corp. v. A & H Doll Mfg. Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 839, 841, 200 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 11 App. Div. 2d 668, 204 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1st Dep't 1960). See
1979]
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condition precedent to arbitration exists."' Recently, in United Na-
tions Development Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co.,' 5 the Court of
Appeals further narrowed the authority of courts to resolve thresh-
old questions under CPLR 7503(b). Confronted with a broad arbi-
tration clause in a commercial contract, the Norkin Court held that
generally 8 WK&M 7502.14. Accordingly, in arbitration controversies, "it is for the court
to determine whether the claim, and therefore the arbitration, is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. ... Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 674,
345 N.E.2d 565, 567, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (1976) (citations omitted); see Andresen & Co. v.
Shepard, 45 App. Div. 2d 578, 579, 360 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (1st Dep't 1974).
"I D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 589, at 839-40 (1978); see Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v.
Conduit & Foundation Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 170, 359 N.E.2d 693, 694-95, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98,
100 (1976). A condition precedent is evidenced by the parties' assent, 5 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 668 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961), and may be interpreted as "express" without any
required form. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 258 (1932). A common contractual condition
precedent is a limitation on the time within which a notice of claim may be made. If such a
provision is not satisfied, the conditional duty to arbitrate is discharged. AFSCO Specialties,
Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 37 Misc. 2d 641, 645, 235 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1962); see Mascioni v. I.B. Miller, Inc., 261 N.Y. 1, 4, 184 N.E. 473, 473 (1933);
Hershey v. Carter, 137 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); S. WILLISTON, supra,
at § 666A. See generally Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33
(1970).
Some courts have distinguished between conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the
contract and conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the arbitration clause. Board of
Educ. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 166 N.E.2d 666, 671, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649, 655
(1960) (Froessel, J., dissenting); Uraga Dock Co. v. Mediterranean & Oriental S.S. Corp., 6
App. Div. 2d 443, 446, 179 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 773, 159 N.E.2d
212, 186 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1959). This is a valid distinction since a court may "not compel
arbitration if an issue exists as to whether the contract ever came into existence." Terminal
Auxiliar Maritima v. Winkler Credit Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 294, 298, 160 N.E.2d 526, 529, 189
N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (1959). If conditions precedent to the making of a contract are unsatisfied,
there is no agreement between the parties and therefore no promise to arbitrate.
In Board of Educ. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 166 N.E.2d 666, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1960), the Court of Appeals held that the court was the proper tribunal for determining
compliance with the time limitations of N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813 (McKinney 1970), a condition
precedent to beginning an action or special proceeding against a school district. Citing
Heckler as support, the Court in Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463,
214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961), expanded this rule to include conditions precedent under a contract.
Id. at 335, 174 N.E.2d at 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (dictum). Thus, when a statute imposes a
condition precedent, the determination of compliance is generally a question for the court.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Wager Constr. Corp., 37 N.Y.2d 283, 290, 333 N.E.2d 353, 357,
372 N.Y.S.2d 45, 50 (1975); Town of Islip v. Stoye, 29 N.Y.2d 524, 525, 272 N.E.2d 573, 573,
324 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (1971), rev'g mem. 35 App. Div. 2d 834,317 N.Y.S.2d 230 (2d Dep't 1970).
Although these cases were decided under the Civil Practice Act, they are still viable under
the CPLR since Article 75 is primarily a codification and clarification of the previous stat-
utes. SECOND REP. at 130; see CPLR 7502. See generally 8 WK&M 7502.04. Once the dispute
is submitted to arbitration, all issues concerning the contract are resolved in that forum.
CPLR 7503, commentary at 283 (Supp. Pam. 1964-1978); see Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit
& Foundation Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 359 N.E.2d 693, 693, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (1976).
1-o 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978), aff'g 59 App. Div. 2d 830,
399 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'g mem. No. 1677/76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb, 4,
1977).
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the issue of compliance with a contractual condition precedent in-
volving the time within which to make a demand for arbitration
should be determined by the arbitrator in the absence of an express
declaration that the time provision was a condition precedent to
arbitration.12 1
Norkin Plumbing Co. (Norkin) successfully bid on a subcon-
tract with United Nations Development Corp. (UNDC) for the
plumbing work required in the construction of a 39-story building.'22
The parties' agreement was embodied in a standard form contract
devised by the American Institute of Architects.'2 This contract
contained a broad arbitration clause and was modified to provide
that a "demand for arbitration shall be made within 60 days after
[a] claim . . . has arisen.' 14 When Norkin was faced with in-
creased costs due to delays in construction, it served a demand for
arbitration.'2 UNDC thereupon brought a proceeding to stay arbi-
tration on the ground that the demand was not made within the
requisite 60-day period. 18 The Supreme Court, New York County,
dismissed UNDC's petition, reasoning that, since the condition pre-
121 45 N.Y.2d at 362, 380 N.E.2d at 254, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
'2 Id. UNDC is a nonprofit public benefit corporation which contracted to build offices,
hotels and other facilities for the United Nations community. Id.
923 Id.
I2 Id., 380 N.E.2d at 254, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426. The subcontract incorporated by refer-
ence the terms of the general contract. Agreement between United Nations Development
Corporation and Norkin Plumbing Co., Inc., Art. I-A at 41. The standard form contract
contained a provision requiring that a notice of demand for arbitration be made "within a
reasonable time." General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Record, at 93. This
was altered to provide:
Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in writing with the other
party to the Contract and with the American Arbitration Association, and a copy
shall be filed with the Architect. The demand for arbitration shall be made within
60 days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen, and in no
event shall it be made after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceed-
ings based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.
Id.
'2 Demand for Arbitration, Record on Appeal, at 9. Norkin attributed the delays in
construction to UNDC and sought to recover the resulting damages through arbitration. Brief
for Respondent, Record on Appeal at 10.
212 45 N.Y.2d at 361, 380 N.E.2d at 254, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Norkin served a demand
for arbitration less than 60 days following the completion of its work on the project. Id.; see
Demand for Arbitration, Record on Appeal at 9. In its motion to stay arbitration under CPLR
7503(b), UNDC contended that the demand was not timely made since it was served more
than 6 months after Norkin notified UNDC that there had been a substantial delay in the
installation of the plumbing. Appellant's Verified Petition, Record on Appeal at 16. Thus,
the dispute focused on the interpretation of the contract language "after the claim. . . has
arisen." Norkin thereafter made a cross motion to compel arbitration. Respondent's Notice
of Cross-Motion to Compel Arbitration, Record on Appeal at 30.
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cedent to arbitration was ambiguous, it was for the arbitrator to
determine whether there was timely compliance with the agree-
ment.'1 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed with-
out opinion. 2 1
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the stay on ap-
peal.12s Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Jasen stated that the
issue turned on whether the condition precedent was express or
implied, not on the clarity of its terms. 3 Noting that CPLR 7503(b)
outlines the limited scope of "judicial inquiry permissible upon an
application to stay arbitration,"'' 3' the Court stated that where an
agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, compliance with a
contractual condition precedent is to be determined by the arbitra-
tor.'32 Despite the presence of a broad arbitration clause, however,
12 Record on Appeal, United Nations Development Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., No.
1677/76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 4, 1977) at 120, 123-24; see note 130 infra. Since the
controversy centered on the meaning of "arisen," see note 126 supra, it would appear that
the phrase was susceptible to more than one interpretation. In finding that it was ambiguous,
however, the lower court relied on a somewhat different rationale: "The clause referred to,
section 7.10.2 is ambiguous. While directing that arbitration be commenced within 60 days
after the claim has 'arisen,' it provides no consequence for delay. On the other hand, it bars
any arbitration where the claim is barred by a statute of limitations." United Nations Devel-
opment Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., No. 1677/76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 4, 1977)
(emphasis in original), Record on Appeal at 123. There was apparently a question as to
whether the remedy was barred by the statute of limitations or whether the underlying right
was barred by noncompliance with the condition precedent. See Paver & Wildfoerster v.
Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 676, 345 N.E.2d 565, 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25
(1976); Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N.Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915). When the ambiguity
of such a condition is at issue, resolution is properly within the authority of the arbitrators.
Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit & Foundation Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 170, 359 N.E.2d 693,
695, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (1976).
"1 59 App. Div. 2d 830, 399 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1977).
In 45 N.Y.2d at 365, 380 N.E.2d at 257, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
110 Id. at 362, 380 N.E.2d at 255, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426-27. Neither party contended that
there was no contractual prerequisite to arbitration; rather, the arguments concentrated on
the ambiguity of the notice provision and whether or not its conditions had been met. Id.
Judge Jasen, however, stated that the parties had "misperceived the issue" by litigating
whether the condition precedent was clear or ambiguous and "overlooked a far more primary
question": whether the admitted condition precedent was express or implied. Id.
131 Id. at 363, 380 N.E.2d at 255, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
132 Id. at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The Court noted that compliance
with the applicable statute of limitations, see CPLR 7502(b); note 118 supra, and statutory
conditions precedent, see note 119 supra, is properly reserved for judicial determination. 45
N.Y.2d at 363, 380 N.E.2d at 255, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427. Contractual conditions precedent,
however, present a more difficult situation. Judge Jasen stated that only where there is a
narrow arbitration clause limiting the issues that may be submitted to arbitration, have
courts considered whether there has been compliance with contractual time and notice provi-
sions. Id. at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 255-56, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427; see Perkins & Will Partnership
v. Syska and Hennessy, 41 N.Y.2d 1045, 364 N.E.2d 832, 396 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1977); American
Plan Corp. v. Jarchin, 53 App. Div. 2d 622, 384 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.). On
the other hand, where there is a broad arbitration clause, courts tend to give full effect to
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Judge Jasen observed that where the parties to the agreement have
included an express condition precedent to arbitration, the issue of
compliance is one for threshold judicial determination.'3 Since the
agreement between the parties in Norkin did not include an express
condition precedent and contained a broad arbitration clause, the
Court concluded that resolution of the question of compliance
the parties' intent and submit all issues to the arbitrators. 45 N.Y.2d at 363-64, 380 N.E.2d
at 255-56, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28; see R.H. Macy & Co. v. National Sleep Prods., Inc., 39
N.Y.2d 268, 271, 347 N.E.2d 887, 888, 383 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1976); Lipman v. Haeuser
Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 80, 43 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1942); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 298, 169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929). See also Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Investors Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 91, 95, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335, 371 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466-67 (1975).
1= 45 N.Y.2d at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28. The Court relied on its
earlier decisions in Raisler Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 298 N.E.2d
91, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973), and Wilaka Constr. Co. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 17
N.Y.2d 195, 216 N.E.2d 696, 269 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1966), citing both cases as support for the
proposition that there exists an exception to "the rule providing for resolution by the arbitra-
tor of questions of compliance with conditions precedent." 45 N.Y.2d at 364, 380 N.E.2d at
256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
Raisler involved a cross-motion to vacate an arbitration award on the grounds that the
arbitrator failed to consider the issue of compliance with an express condition precedent. The
Court of Appeals confirmed the award, reasoning that even had the arbitrator erred as a
matter of law, the error would be unreviewable. 32 N.Y.2d at 285, 298 N.E.2d at 99, 344
N.Y.S.2d at 925. The Norkin Court placed its reliance on dictum in Raisler that the presence
of an express condition precedent in an arbitration clause would make compliance initially a
question for the court. The Raisler Court observed, however, that "usually, the limitations
of time, and related requirements, are not made conditions precedent to arbitration," and
therefore compliance is for arbitral decision. Id. at 282, 298 N.E.2d at 96, 344 N.Y.S.2d at
922. The Raisler statement, however, could be interpreted to depend on whether there is a
condition precedent at all, not whether the condition is express or implied.
The Wilaka Court also declared that "the fulfillment of conditions precedent to arbitra-
tion is a question for the .. . court." 17 N.Y.2d at 198, 216 N.E.2d at 69, 269 N.Y.S.2d at
698. It seems only happenstance that, as in Raisler, the arbitration clause used the term
"condition precedent." Neither Raisler nor Wilaka extended this concept to argue that the
only time satisfaction of conditions precedent is determinable by the courts is when they are
expressly so designated. In this sense, the Norkin decision has created a new rule and clarified
a controversial area of the law under Article 75. See note 137 infra.
The Norkin Court distinguished its decision in Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit & Foun-
dation Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 359 N.E.2d 693, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1976). Pearl Street, which
involved the interpretation of two interrelated contracts, implied that the court should retain
jurisdiction "in the usual case [where] the existence of a condition precedent has been agreed
to by the parties or is otherwise established, and their threshold dispute is as to performance
or nonperformance of that condition." Id. at 170, 359 N.E.2d at 695, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
The primary contract contained a broad arbitration clause and a merger clause, but had no
conditions precedent. Id. at 169-70, 359 N.E.2d at 694, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The standard form
general contract included a broad arbitration clause and a second provision requiring initial
submission of any dispute to the architect before arbitration could be sought. Id. at 170, 359
N.E.2d at 694, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The facts of Norkin were essentially identical, but the
Court abandoned the Pearl Street rationale that the ambiguity of the situation required
arbitral resolution. Instead, despite the manifest intent and clear language of the parties, the
Norkin Court opted for a new rule that requires explicit language before a judicial determina-
tion may be obtained. See note 124 supra.
1979]
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should be left to the arbitrator.'34
The distinction drawn between express and implied conditions
precedent by the Norkin Court is novel and finds support in neither
the language of CPLR 7503(b) nQr its statutory history.' 35 While
there would seem to have been ample support for permitting courts
to determine whether there has been compliance with clearly im-
plied conditions precedent,' 3 the rule adopted in Norkin is advanta-
geous in that it clearly circumscribes the permissible scope of judi-
cial inquiry under CPLR 7503(b). Thus, the Norkin holding will
serve to resolve the uncertainty that has resulted from inconsistent
rationales and decisions rendered by courts interpreting the stat-
ute.3 7 In the future, in the absence of a condition precedent being
so labeled in the contract, the question whether a condition prece-
dent has been complied with, and the broader question whether a
condition precedent exists, will be determined by the arbitrator as
are other issues of contract interpretation.
'4 45 N.Y.2d at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The Court declared:
We hold that the contractual limitation upon the time within which a demand
for arbitration was required to be filed does not constitute an express condition
precedent permitting threshold judicial resolution of the question of compliance,
but, rather, constitutes a matter of procedural arbitrability to be determined by the
arbitrator.
Id. at 362, 380 N.E.2d at 254, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
"I See SECOND REP. at 136-37; note 117 supra.
1 See note 118 supra.
117 Courts have been divided on the issue of who should determine compliance with
contractual conditions precedent. Guilderland Cent. School Dist. v. Guilderland Cent.
Teachers Ass'n, 45 App. Div. 2d 85, 87, 356 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691-92 (3d Dep't 1974); accord,
Board of Educ. v. Brentwood Teachers Ass'n, 79 Misc. 2d 758, 761, 361 N.Y.S.2d 570, 574-75
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1974). Notwithstanding the presence of a broad arbitration clause
and an implied condition precedent provision, some courts have placed the determination of
compliance within the authority of the courts, while others defer to the arbitral forum.
Compare Opan Realty Corp. v. Pedrone, 36 N.Y.2d 943, 944, 335 N.E.2d 854, 855, 373
N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (1975) (per curiam) and New York Tel. Co. v. Schumacher & Forelle, Inc.,
60 App. Div. 2d 151, 154, 400 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (lst Dep't 1977) with Brown &" Guenther v.
North Queensview Homes, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 327, 328, 239 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (1st Dep't
1963) and Tuttman v. Kattan. Talamas Export Corp., 274 App. Div. 395, 396, 83 N.Y.S.2d
651, 652 (1st Dep't 1948) (per curiam).
Compliance with express conditions precedent has generally been determined in the
judicial tribunal. Raisler Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 298 N.E.2d
91, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973); Wilaka Constr. Co. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 17 N.Y.2d
195, 216 N.E.2d 696, 269 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1966); Frouge Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
26 App. Div. 2d 269, 273 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam).
In Guilderland Cent. School Dist. v. Guilderland Cent. Teachers Ass'n, 45 App. Div. 2d
85, 356 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1974), Justice Cooke recognized an apparent trend, "at least
in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or an express provision making compliance
with contractual time limitations conditions precedent to arbitration, to treat contractual
time limitations . . . as matters of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrators . "Id. at
87, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (citations omitted).
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The result in Norkin is apparently best explained by the favor
with which New York views the arbitral process.1 38 Since a broad
arbitration clause indicates a clear intent by the parties to an agree-
ment to submit any controversy to arbitration, it can be argued that
it is proper for the arbitrator to determine the existence of, and
compliance with, conditions precedent where they are not made
express by the terms of the contract. 39 At the very least, Norkin will
'" See Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399 (1875). Since New York
passed its first Arbitration Act, ch. 275, [1920] N.Y. LAWS 803 (repealed 1937) the Court has
consistently upheld arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation. See, e.g., Prinze v. Jonas,
38 N.Y.2d 570, 574, 345 N.E.2d 295, 298, 381 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (1976); Weinrott v. Carp, 32
N.Y.2d 190, 199, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (1973); In re Feuer Transp., Inc.,
295 N.Y. 87, 91, 65 N.E.2d 178, 180 (1946); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 353, 174 N.E.
706, 707 (1931). Although arbitration has the advantage of expediency, informality, finality
and the expertise of chosen arbitrators, it is generally not subject to legal principles or judicial
review. See Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626, 237 N.E.2d
223, 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1968); Bay Iron Works, Inc. v. Eisenstein, 17 App. Div. 2d
804, 804-05, 232 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam). Only in specific circumstan-
ces will courts review an arbitrator's decision. Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 358 N.E.2d 484,
389 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1976); Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cent.
School Dist., 54 App. Div. 2d 498, 389 N.Y.S.2d 667 (4th Dep't 1976); CPLR 7511 (1963). See
generally TmIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CoNmERENcE 94, 96-101 (1958); H. WAcHTELL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 475-76 (5th ed. 1976); F. WHITNE, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMER-
c1AL PRAcTIcEs § 168, at 226-27 (2d ed. 1965). The Norkin decision also brings interpretation
of New York arbitration law closer to judicial interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976), which strongly favor the arbitral process. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942). Significantly, federal law reserves all issues in contro-
versy for the arbitrator where the parties have agreed to a broad arbitration clause. Aksen,
Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Rzv. 1, 5-7 (1968).
See generally D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 607 (1978).
' County of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 123, 128, 366 N.E.2d 72,
75, 397 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (1977). Where a broad arbitration clause is adopted, it is the general
view that the courts should give effect to the parties' intent. See note 132 supra. It should be
noted, however, that courts traditionally have distinguished commercial arbitration contracts
from collective bargaining agreements. G.E. Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 288, 265
N.E.2d 747, 750, 317 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (1970); Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d
380, 387, 207 N.E.2d 190, 196, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 148 (1965). Although public policy generally
favors arbitration, the courts recognize that in a commercial agreement the parties are relin-
quishing a substantial right by agreeing to arbitrate their differences and, therefore, the
contract language must clearly indicate what issues the parties desire the arbitrator to decide.
See, e.g., Siegel v. 141 Bowery Corp., 51 App. Div. 2d 209, 212, 380 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1st
Dep't 1976) (mei.); Littlejohn & Co. v. J. Berlage Co., 20 App. Div. 697, 247 N.Y.S.2d 56,
(1st Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 530, 202 N.E.2d 566, 254 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1964).
When collective bargaining is involved, however, the "special economic circumstances which
surround the institution," Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380,387,207 N.E.2d
190, 194, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 148 (1965), establish a strong "presumption of arbitrability,"
rebuttable only by specific exclusion of the issue from arbitration. G.E. Howard & Co. v.
Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 290-91, 265 N.E.2d 747, 750, 317 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330-31 (1970); accord,
Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 46 App. Div.
2d 104, 361 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1974); Morris Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Morris
19791
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serve to put draftsmen of broad arbitration provisions on notice that
if judicial resolution of the issue of compliance with conditions pre-
cedent is desired, the conditions must be express. Absent such a




CPL § 310.50(2): Jury's noncompliance with trial court's
instructions does not, per se, require resubmission of verdict
Under CPL § 310.50(2), "the court. . . must direct the jury to
reconsider" its verdict when the verdict "is not in accordance with
the [trial] court's instructions . *"... ,0 Recently, however, in
People v. Robinson,'41 the Court of Appeals held that unless the
jury's intention with respect to individual counts of an indictment
is unclear, the failure of a jury to comply with the court's instruc-
tions does not, per se, require resubmission of the case.4 2
The defendant in Robinson was charged with criminal sale,
criminal possession with intent to sell and simple possession of a
controlled substance.13 Before submitting the case to the jury, the
judge properly instructed it to consider the lesser included offen-
ses 144 of criminal possession with intent to sell and simple possession
Educ. Ass'n, 84 Misc. 2d 675, 376 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1975). It is submit-
ted that the Norkin decision will have the effect of minimizing the difference between com-
mercial arbitration and collective bargaining.
140 CPL § 310.50(2) provides in pertinent part:
If the jury renders a verdict which in form is not in accordance with the court's
instructions or which is otherwise legally defective, the court must explain the
defect or error and must direct the jury to reconsider such verdict, to resume its
deliberation for such purpose, and to render a proper verdict.
CPL § 310.50(2) represents a codification of CCP §§ 447-449 (1881) in revised form. See CPL
§ 310.50(2), commentary at 593 (1971).
14 45 N.Y.2d 448, 382 N.E.2d 759, 410 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1978).
2 Id. at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 761, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
"4 Id. at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The defendant, Marion Robinson,
was indicted for his alleged participation in two separate drug transactions. The six-count
indictment charged him with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.41(1) (Supp. 1978-1979); criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree, id. § 220.39(1); two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell in the third degree, id. § 220.16(1); criminal possession of a controlled substance
in the fifth degree, id. § 220.09(1); criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh
degree, id. § 220.03.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 451, 382 N.E.2d at 760, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 60. CPL § 1.20(37) defines lesser
included offense as follows: "when it is impossible to commit a particular crime without
